El objetivo de este artículo es explorar las relaciones entre la religión católica y la kultura en Timor-Leste desde una perspectiva histórica y antropológica. Pretendemos mostrar que la relación entre ambas se produce mediante una tensa coexistencia y que no se trata apenas de un sincretismo, resultado de la mezcla de elementos tomados de ambas. Para ello veremos cómo ambos regímenes de creencias se apropian de conceptos ajenos a su liturgia y los resignifican representándolos desde sus propios principios cosmovisvos. Veremos (...) también, mediante un análisis del discurso de un especialista ritual, cómo éste manipula activamente entidades no-humanas de ambos regímenes de creencias, reensamblándolos de un modo que le beneficia, con el objetivo de reforzar su posición en la jerarquía social. Así, mostramos cómo el análisis del enrolamiento de este tipo de entidades en el discurso se hace fundamental para entender los mecanismos de adquisición y distribución de poder en el país. (shrink)

Epithelial hair follicle stem cells (eHFSCs) are required to generate, maintain and renew the continuously cycling hair follicle (HF), supply cells that produce the keratinized hair shaft and aid in the reepithelialization of injured skin. Therefore, their study is biologically and clinically important, from alopecia to carcinogenesis and regenerative medicine. However, human eHFSCs remain ill defined compared to their murine counterparts, and it is unclear which murine eHFSC markers really apply to the human HF. We address this by reviewing current (...) concepts on human eHFSC biology, their immediate progeny and their molecular markers, focusing on Keratin 15 and 19, CD200, CD34, PHLDA1, and EpCAM/Ber‐EP4. After delineating how human eHFSCs may be selectively targeted experimentally, we close by defining as yet unmet key challenges in human eHFSC research. The ultimate goal is to transfer emerging concepts from murine epithelial stem cell biology to human HF physiology and pathology. (shrink)

El presente artículo trata la presentación que Henry Corbin hace del sufismo de Ibn ' Arabī. Pretende mostrar cómo el proyecto filosófico del pensador francés (atravesado de protestantismo, heideggerianismo y fenomenología) produce una obturación de la doctrina akbarí, que denota cierta falta de amor o desinterésen la alteridad en tanto alteridad. El itinerario constará de cinco pasos. Primero, nos acercaremos a los años de formación de Corbin. Segundo, presentaremo salgunos puntos esenciales de su obra más célebre, La imaginación creadora en (...) el sufismo de Ibn ‘Arabî. Tercero, se mostrarán aquellos aspectos de la doctrinade Ibn ' Arabī allí obturados. Cuarto, expondremos algunas conclusiones a partir de estas ausencias. Quinto, a modo de epílogo, y ya en el ámbito de la filosofía latinoamericana, ofreceremos una mirada al proyecto de la transmodernidad de Enrique Dussel, desde el paradigma del amor akbarí. (shrink)

Colombia is the second country with the highest number of internally displaced persons. In the last 10 years, more than 400,000 young people carry, in their life experiences, the title of victims. The psychological and social circumstances that determine the lives of displaced young people in the world are not unknown. Fear, the poor resources for social adaptation available to them, and the possible reproduction of the cycle of violence, represent psychosocial risk factors in the young and displaced population. In (...) this context, the Victims Law in Colombia stipulated various measures of repairment, including Relocation and Return provided the conditions of voluntariness, security, and dignity are present. A hypothesis that well-being will be better in the returnees was set, since they would strengthen the social support networks between neighbors and other victims in their old spaces of life. To test the hypothesis, the scales of Psychological Well-being, Social Well-being, the Satisfaction with Life Scale, and the Psychosocial Trauma Scale were applied to young returnees and relocated in Colombia. The Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor Analysis was performed to extract the general measure of well-being and psychosocial trauma followed by the comparison between the groups. Significance, power, and effect size indicators were obtained, and finally, the partial correlation between the groups was made in relation to psychosocial trauma and well-being. Results showed that returnees have greater well-being and clearer indicators, with respect to that of relocated. In addition, the well-being of returnees has fewer trauma factors, who in turn are quasi-moderated by the situation of return or relocation. (shrink)

RESUMEN Introducción: La dimensión ambiental constituye un proceso esencial en la formación de profesionales, de modo que en el desempeño de su profesión puedan educar hacia el desarrollo sostenible a las futuras generaciones. Objetivo: Representar en un modelo pedagógico la lógica de la dimensión ambiental en la formación laboral investigativa de los profesionales en la universidad. Materiales y métodos: Se utilizaron métodos teóricos, empíricos y matemáticos-estadísticos. Resultados: Elaboración del modelo pedagógico de dimensión ambiental en la formación laboral investigativa de los (...) profesionales en formación. El modelo está estructurado en tres subsistemas: uno teórico, se centra en la integración de saberes pedagógico ambientales a partir de las relaciones que se establecen entre sus componentes, otro metodológico, el cual resume la proyección ambiental de la formación laboral investigativa y un subsistema procedimental, que manifiesta la instrumentación transformadora ambiental que debe ocurrir en los estudiantes. El modelo aporta una cualidad sinérgica que le imprime identidad, totalidad y contribuye a su autodesarrollo. Conclusiones: Con la elaboración del modelo se revelan nuevas interpretaciones que se manifiestan como relaciones teóricas funcionales surgidas entre los componentes de los subsistemas que lo integran y a la vez, entre los subsistemas como macro componentes. La validación del modelo resultó estadísticamente significativa, mediante la instrumentación de una estrategia pedagógica para la dimensión ambiental en la formación laboral investigativa. ABSTRACT Introduction: The environmental component is an essential process in the training of professionals, that enables them to educate future generations towards sustainable development. Objective: To represent in a pedagogical model the logic of the environmental dimension in the research training of professionals. Materials and methods: Theoretical, empirical and mathematical-statistical methods were used. Findings: The development of the pedagogical model of environmental dimension in research and labor training of professionals. The model is structured in three subsystems: the first focuses on the integration of environmental pedagogical knowledge from the relationships established between its components; the second is of a methodological character and summarizes the environmental projection of research training; whereas the third one is procedural, expressing the environmental transformative instrumentation that must occur in students. The model provides a synergistic quality that consolidates identity, totality and contributes to its self-development. Conclusions: With the elaboration of the model new interpretations are revealed that are manifested as functional theoretical relations arising between the components of the subsystems that integrate it and at the same time, between the subsystems as macro components. The evaluation of the model was statistically significant, through the instrumentation of a pedagogical strategy for the environmental dimension in the research and labor training. (shrink)

Dos conceptos centrales para comprender la obra de Enrique Dussel son los de totalidad y exterioridad. Ambos aparecen en toda la variedad temática de su obra: en trabajos de ética, de historia de la filosofía, de filosofía política, teología o de crítica económica. Este artículo se propone un recorrido por ambos conceptos teniendo en cuenta la presencia de una doble argumentación: una de corte filosófica y otra de raíz histórica. El objetivo es poner en evidencia cierto reenvío de uno (...) a otro plano de las argumentaciones filosófica e histórica que presenta ciertos atolladeros. Para ello, se expone primero la concepción filosófica de la totalidad y luego la necesidad de dar cuenta de su carácter estructurador: el llamado núcleo ético-mítico. Se exponen también los dos caminos ético-míticos generales que de facto tomaron las grandes civilizaciones, mostrando luego -ejemplificando con las relaciones entre cristianismo y Cristiandad- las relaciones complejas e inestables entre totalidades, la exterioridad, tanto en su dimensión metafísica como histórica, y el problema del fetichismo. Luego, introduciremos algunas consideraciones en torno a las ideas de différance y de dislocación ateniendo a su impacto en el pensamiento decolonial. A partir de allí, dada la ausencia de origen o centro trascendental, se matiza la idea de totalidad cerrada; se revisa la noción de núcleo ético-mítico en su carácter monolítico, unívoco y monovalente; y se complejiza la cuestión de la exterioridad -y su relación con la idea de víctima-poniendo en cuestión su carácter metafísico u originario. (shrink)

Pretende-se, nesta recensão, mostrar a dimensão englobante da política e da filosofia, em Galván, a partir do envolvimento cívico-ecológico que Tierno Galván manifestou politicamente, enquando alcaide de Madrid, traduzida numa preocupação prática e vivencial pelo bem-estar comum.

Abortion is largely accepted even for reasons that do not have anything to do with the fetus' health. By showing that (1) both fetuses and newborns do not have the same moral status as actual persons, (2) the fact that both are potential persons is morally irrelevant and (3) adoption is not always in the best interest of actual people, the authors argue that what we call ‘after-birth abortion’ (killing a newborn) should be permissible in all the cases where abortion (...) is, including cases where the newborn is not disabled. (shrink)

I argue that there are significant moral reasons in addition to harm prevention for making vaccination against certain common infectious diseases compulsory. My argument is based on an analogy between vaccine refusal and tax evasion. First, I discuss some of the arguments for compulsory vaccination that are based on considerations of the risk of harm that the non‐vaccinated would pose on others; I will suggest that the strength of such arguments is contingent upon circumstances and that in order to provide (...) the strongest defence possible of compulsory vaccination, such arguments need to be supplemented by additional arguments. I will then offer my additional argument for compulsory vaccination: I will argue that in both cases of vaccine refusal and of tax evasion individuals fail to make their fair contribution to important social and public goods, regardless of whether each individual contribution ‘makes a difference’. While fairness considerations have sometimes been used to support a moral duty to vaccinate, they have not been appealed to in order to argue for a legal duty to vaccinate. I will suggest that this is due, among other things, to a misapplication of the principle of the least restrictive alternative in public health. Finally, I will address nine possible objections to my argument. (shrink)

Social and environmental ratings provided by social rating agencies are multidimensional. The first goal of our paper is to identify a small number of independent and relevant socially responsible (SR) dimensions reflecting a firms’ coherent posture toward social issues. We put forward that these dimensions are not exactly the same as the ESG ones (Environment, Social, and Governance). Using the six sub-ratings provided by the Vigeo rating agency, we perform a principal component analysis and we highlight three main independent SR (...) dimensions related to (1) business stakeholders (employees, customers, and suppliers), (2) societal stakeholders (environment and society), and (3) financial stakeholders (stockholders and debt holders). The second objective of our paper is to explore the link between stock returns and these three SR dimensions. Our most notable finding is that for each SR dimension, investors ask for an additional risk premium when they accept to hold non-socially responsible stocks. The cost of equity is thus lower for SR firms. The average premium over the period 2003–2010 is larger for the components “business stakeholders” and “financial stakeholders” than for the component “societal stakeholders.” The premium for this last component has only existed since the end of 2008. Since that time, environment and community involvement have become important risk factors strongly considered by investors. For the three dimensions, investors notably penalize large non-social firms and reward small social firms. (shrink)

This major publication is a history of the semantic tradition in philosophy from the early nineteenth century through its incarnation in the work of the Vienna Circle, the group of logical positivists that emerged in the years 1925–1935 in Vienna who were characterised by a strong commitment to empiricism, a high regard for science, and a conviction that modern logic is the primary tool of analytic philosophy. In the first part of the book, Alberto Coffa traces the roots of (...) logical positivism in a semantic tradition that arose in opposition to Kant's theory that a priori knowledge is based on pure intuition and the constitutive powers of the mind. In Part II, Coffa chronicles the development of this tradition by members and associates of the Vienna Circle. Much of Coffa's analysis draws on the unpublished notes and correspondence of many philosophers. The book, however, is not merely a history of the semantic tradition from Kant 'to the Vienna Station'. Coffa also critically reassesses the role of semantic notions in understanding the ground of a priori knowledge and its relation to empirical knowledge and questions the turn the tradition has taken since Vienna. (shrink)

Cameron et al ’s1 ethical considerations about the ‘Dualism of Values’ in pandemic response emphasise the need to strike a fair balance between the interests of the less vulnerable to COVID-19 and the interests of the more vulnerable. Those considerations are at the basis of ethical defences of focused protection strategies.2 One example is the proposal put forward in the Great Barrington Declaration. It presented focused protection strategies as more ethical alternatives to lockdowns which would prevent lockdowns’ ‘irreparable damage, with (...) the underprivileged disproportionately harmed’.3 Here we want to suggest that a version of Cameron et al ’s analysis can be applied to the case of vaccines to support a focused protection vaccination strategy. At this stage, we should limit vaccination to the vulnerable and not target children in COVID-19 vaccination strategies. We argue that, given the current state of knowledge about COVID-19, immunity and vaccines, it would be wrong to pose the costs and risks of vaccines on children for three reasons. First, they are unlikely to benefit from COVID-19 vaccination …. (shrink)

We discuss the relationship between expertise, expert authority, and trust in the case of vaccine research and policy, with a particular focus on COVID-19 vaccines. We argue that expert authority is not merely an epistemic notion, but entails being trusted by the relevant public and is valuable if it is accompanied by expert trustworthiness. Trustworthiness requires, among other things, being transparent, acknowledging uncertainty and expert disagreement (e.g., around vaccines’ effectiveness and safety), being willing to revise views in response to new (...) evidence, and being clear about the values that underpin expert recommendations. We explore how failure to acknowledge expert disagreement and uncertainty can undermine trust in vaccination and public health experts, using expert recommendations around COVID-19 vaccines as a case study. (shrink)

Conflict of interests in medicine are typically taken to be financial in nature: it is often assumed that a COI occurs when a healthcare practitioner’s financial interest conflicts with patients’ interests, public health interests, or professional obligations more generally. Even when non-financial COIs are acknowledged, ethical concerns are almost exclusively reserved for financial COIs. However, the notion of “interests” cannot be reduced to its financial component. Individuals in general, and medical professionals in particular, have different types of interests, many of (...) which are non-financial in nature but can still conflict with professional obligations. The debate about healthcare delivery has largely overlooked this broader notion of interests. Here, we will focus on health practitioners’ moral or religious values as particular types of personal interests involved in healthcare delivery that can generate COIs and on conscientious objection in healthcare as the expression of a particular type of COI. We argue that, in the healthcare context, the COIs generated by interests of conscience can be as ethically problematic, and therefore should be treated in the same way, as financial COIs. (shrink)

To the extent that antibiotic resistance (ABR) is accelerated by antibiotic consumption and that it represents a serious public health emergency, it is imperative to drastically reduce antibiotic consumption, particularly in high‐income countries. I present the problem of ABR as an instance of the collective action problem known as ‘tragedy of the commons’. I propose that there is a strong ethical justification for taxing certain uses of antibiotics, namely when antibiotics are required to treat minor and self‐limiting infections, such as (...) respiratory tract infections, in otherwise healthy individuals. Taxation would allow a reduction in consumption (given certain behavioural economics assumptions) and/or ensure that individuals internalize or compensate for their contribution to the erosion of the common good of antibiotic effectiveness. I suggest that revenue from the tax could be used to fund conservation and innovation strategies. Taxation might be a coercive policy, especially for certain individuals, but the ethical case for coercive policies is very strong when the good to be preserved is important enough and when they force individuals to do something they have a moral obligation to do anyway. I argue that, in the case of mild and self‐limiting infections, individuals have a moral duty of easy rescue and a moral duty of fairness to make their contribution to the preservation of the common good of antibiotic effectiveness by foregoing antibiotics. I also suggest that taxing antibiotics in such cases is an all things considered ethically justified policy even if it would introduce inequalities in access to healthcare. (shrink)

The range of opportunities people enjoy in life largely depends on social, biological, and genetic factors for which individuals are not responsible. Philosophical debates about equality of opportunities have focussed mainly on addressing social determinants of inequalities. However, the introduction of human bioenhancement should make us reconsider what our commitment to equality entails. We propose a way of improving morally relevant equality that is centred on what we consider a fair distribution of bioenhancements. In the first part, we identify three (...) main positions in the debate on bioenhancement and equality, and we show how each of them fails to meet the demands of a serious commitment to equality. In the second part, we formulate a new proposal that we think better promotes equality of opportunities: people from disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds should be given access to bioenhancements while people from privileged socio-economic background should be prohibited from using them. We argue that those who are concerned about the inequality implications of bioenhancement should embrace this solution, rather than reject bioenhancement. (shrink)

In a paper recently published in this journal, Navin and Largent argue in favour of a type of policy to regulate non-medical exemptions from childhood vaccination which they call ‘Inconvenience’. This policy makes it burdensome for parents to obtain an exemption to child vaccination, for example, by requiring parents to attend immunization education sessions and to complete an application form to receive a waiver. Navin and Largent argue that this policy is preferable to ‘Eliminationism’, i.e. to policies that do not (...) allow non-medical exemptions, because Inconvenience has been shown to maintain exemption rates low while not harming parents by forcing them to do something that goes against their beliefs. We argue that it is at least doubtful that Inconvenience is ethically preferable to Eliminationism: while the latter disregards the value of liberty, Inconvenience disregards the value of fairness in the distribution of the burdens entailed by the preservation of a public good like herd immunity. We propose a variant of Inconvenience, which we call ‘Contribution’, which we think is preferable to the versions of Inconvenience discussed by Navin and Largent in that it successfully strikes a balance between the values of parents’ liberty, fairness and expected utility. (shrink)

This research extends previous findings related to the positive influence of company credibility on a social Cause–Brand Alliance’s (CBA) persuasion mechanism. This study analyzes the mediating role of two dimensions of company credibility (trustworthiness and expertise) with regard to the influence of altruistic attributions and two types of brand–cause fit (functional and image fit) on corporate social responsibility image. A structural equation model tests the proposed framework with a sample of 299 consumers, and the results suggest that (1) image fit (...) and altruistic attribution are cues that consumers use to evaluate company trustworthiness when linking to a social cause; (2) functional fit significantly influences perceived company expertise but not trustworthiness; and (3) trustworthiness has more weight than expertise in judgments about corporate social responsibility. (shrink)

We argue that, in certain circumstances, doctors might beprofessionallyjustified to provide abortions even in those jurisdictions where abortion is illegal. That it is at least professionally permissible does not mean that they have an all-things-considered ethical justification or obligation to provide illegal abortions or that professional obligations or professional permissibility trump legal obligations. It rather means that professional organisations should respect and indeed protect doctors’ positive claims of conscience to provide abortions if they plausibly track what is in the best (...) medical interests of their patients. It is the responsibility of state authorities to enforce the law, but it is the responsibility of professional organisations to uphold the highest standards of medical ethics, even when they conflict with the law. Whatever the legal sanctions in place, healthcare professionals should not be sanctioned by the professional bodies for providing abortions according to professional standards, even if illegally. Indeed, professional organisation should lobby to offer protection to such professionals. Our arguments have practical implications for what healthcare professionals and healthcare professional organisations may or should do in those jurisdictions that legally prohibit abortion, such as some US States after the reversal ofRoe v Wade. (shrink)

A comparison is given between two conditions used to define logical constants: Belnap's uniqueness and Hacking's deducibility of identicals. It is shown that, in spite of some surface similarities, there is a deep difference between them. On the one hand, deducibility of identicals turns out to be a weaker and less demanding condition than uniqueness. On the other hand, deducibility of identicals is shown to be more faithful to the inferentialist perspective, permitting definition of genuinely proof-theoretical concepts. This kind of (...) analysis is driven by exploiting the Curry–Howard correspondence. In particular, deducibility of identicals is shown to correspond to the computational property of eta expansion, which is essential in the characterization of propositional identity. (shrink)

Conscientious objection in healthcare is often granted by many legislations regulating morally controversial medical procedures, such as abortion or medical assistance in dying. However, there is virtually no protection of positive claims of conscience, that is, of requests by healthcare professionals to provide certain services that they conscientiously believe ought to be provided, but that are ruled out by institutional policies. Positive claims of conscience have received comparatively little attention in academic debates. Some think that negative and positive claims of (...) conscience deserve equal protection in terms of measures that institutions ought to take to accommodate them. However, in this issue of The Journal of Clinical Ethics (JCE), Abram Brummett argues against this symmetry thesis. He suggests that the relevant distinction is not between negative and positive claims of conscience, but between negative and positive rights of conscience. He argues that conscientious refusals and positive claims of conscience are both already protected as negative rights of conscience, but that this does not require institutions to accommodate positive claims of conscience. In this article I will argue that both Brummett and the authors he criticizes share a wrong view about the existence of conscience rights in healthcare. I will argue that there is no right to conscientious objection in healthcare, whether positive or negative. Thus, contra Brummett, I argue that the question whether such rights are positive or negative is as irrelevant as the question whether the claims of conscience are positive or negative. (shrink)

This note makes a contribution to the issue raised in a paper by Popper and Miller (1983) in which it was claimed that probabilistic support is purely deductive. Developing R. C. Jeffrey's remarks, a new general approach to the crucial concept of "going beyond" is here proposed. By means of it a quantitative measure of the inductive component of a probabilistic inference is reached. This proposal leads to vindicating the view that typical predictive probabilistic inferences by enumeration and analogy are (...) purely inductive. (shrink)

The debate around lockdowns as a response to the recent pandemic is typically framed in terms of a tension between freedom and health. However, on some views, protection of health or reduction of virus‐related risks can also contribute to freedom. Therefore, there might be no tension between freedom and health in public health restrictions. I argue that such views fail to appreciate the different understandings of freedom that are involved in the trade‐off between freedom and health. Grasping these distinctions would (...) allow to appreciate why different people give more weight to different aspects of limitations of freedom, including whether certain options are made simply risky or impossible, whether limitations of freedom are posed intentionally or happen accidentally, whether risks are beyond a threshold of acceptability, and who gets to decide that. I provide a conceptual analysis of the relationship between different types of freedom, public health policies, viruses and diseases. As I argue, identifying what freedom‐based reasons count for and against different types of public health restrictions requires distinguishing between viruses and diseases, between lockdowns and other types of restrictive policies, and between risks posed by viruses and threats of penalties involved by restrictive policies. (shrink)

Reliance on intuitive and emotive responses is widespread across many areas of bioethics, and the current debate on biotechnological human enhancement is particularly interesting in this respect. A strand of “bioconservatives” that has explicitly drawn connections to the modern conservative tradition, dating back to Edmund Burke, appeals explicitly to the alleged wisdom of our intuitions and emotions to ground opposition to some biotechnologies or their uses. So-called bioliberals, those who in principle do not oppose human bioenhancement, tend to rely on (...) rational arguments and to see intuitions and emotions mostly as sources of biases. This approach often translates into shifting the burden of proof onto bioconservatives and challenging them to provide arguments against the proposed enhancement to back what bioliberals perceive as merely intuitive, emotive, and irrational reactions. -/- In this article, I am going to show that the methodological divide between bioliberals and bioconservatives is less significant than at first glance it appears to be and less significant than it is often taken to be. I will do so by defending two theses. The first is that reliance on intuitions and emotions is not a prerogative of bioconservatives: bioliberals have their typical intuitions and emotive responses and are for this reason exposed to potential biases in the same way as bioconservatives are. The second thesis is that reliance on intuitions and emotions is not necessarily antithetic to reason and rationality. This latter thesis has been philosophically defended with particular reference to the debate on biotechnologies, while the former is perhaps more controversial and more difficult to accept—at least for bioliberals. In both cases, I will support the claims by drawing on resources from the field of moral psychology and the sciences of the mind and, particularly, by applying to some positions in the enhancement debate recent findings about the role of intuitions and emotions in human moral assessment. This new empirically informed perspective holds promises for solving the methodological controversy between bioconservatives and bioliberals, thus enabling proper dialogue and debate between the two sides. (shrink)

This paper presents a restructured set of axioms for categorical logic. In virtue of it, the syllogistic with indefinite terms is deduced and proved, within the categorical logic boundaries. As a result, the number of all the conclusive syllogisms is deduced through a simple and axiomatic methodology. Moreover, the distinction between immediate and mediate inferences disappears, which reinstitutes the unity of Aristotelian logic.

Some people have stressed that there is a close analogy between meaning experiences, i.e., experiences as of understanding concerning linguistic expressions, and seeing-in experiences, i.e., pictorial experiences of discerning a certain item – what a certain picture presents, viz. the picture’s subject – in another item – the picture’s vehicle, the picture’s physical basis. Both can be seen as fusion experiences, in the minimal sense that they are experiential wholes made up of different aspects. Actually, two important similarities between such (...) experiences may lead one to think that they are experiences of the same type. In this paper, however, I will try to show that notwithstanding such similarities, these experiences are typologically different. For there are two dissimilarities between such experiences that are more relevant on this typological concern than their similarities. Indeed, unlike meaning experiences, seeing-in experiences are first of all recognitional experiences of a sort that makes them perceptual experiences as well. Moreover, again unlike meaning experiences, seeing-in experiences are fusion experiences in the substantial sense that the experiential whole is more than the sum of its experiential parts taken in isolation, for when such parts figure in that whole, they interact with each other. In a nutshell, unlike meaning experiences, seeing-in experiences are proper fusion experiences. (shrink)

Today philosophical discussion on indicative conditionals is dominated by the so called Lewis Triviality Results, according to which, tehere is no binary connective '-->' (let alone truth-functional) such that the probability of p --> q equals the probability of q conditionally on p, so that P(p --> q)= P(q|p). This tenet, that suggests that conditonals lack truth-values, has been challenged in 1991 by Goodman et al. who show that using a suitable three-valued logic the above equation may be restored. In (...) this paper it is first analysed a long neglected paper by Bruno de Finetti, written in 1935, where the essentials of Goodman's theory was clearly outlined. It is also stressed that de Finetti anticipated Kleene's as well as Bochvar and Blamey ideas. In the second part of the paper it is argued that the de Finetti-Goodman's original theory is defective and leads to absurd results. However, a new semantics, called semantics of hypervaluations, is here defined, that avoids the defects of the original theory. This appears to be a powerful challenge to Lewis Triviality results and to the thesis by which conditionals lack truth-values as well. (shrink)

In this paper, I want to deal with the problem of how to find an adequate context of interpretation for indexical sentences that enables one to account for the intuitive truth-conditional content which some apparently puzzling indexical sentences like “I am not here now” as well as other such sentences contextually have. In this respect, I will pursue a fictionalist line. This line allows for shifts in interpretation contexts and urges that such shifts are governed by pretense, which has to (...) be understood in terms of socially shared make-believe games. By appealing to pretense so conceived, I will show that the fictionalist perspective is halfway between an intentionalist perspective, according to which the above indexical sentences have to be interpreted in a shifted intended context, (this perspective is primarily defined by Predelli 1998, Analysis 58, 107; Mind and Language 13, 400) and a conventionalist perspective, according to which indexical reference shifts in accordance with a conventional setting. (For this perspective, cf. Corazza et al. 2002, Philosophical Studies 107, See also Corazza 2004, Reflecting the Mind: Indexicality and Quasi-Indexicality, Oxford University Press). Finally, I will claim that the fictionalist analysis of cases of non-ordinary uses of indexicals like “here” and “now” can be retained in face of a new alternative analysis of those cases in terms of an ‘unbound anaphora’ – theory (cf. Corazza 2004, Synthese 138, 145). (shrink)

Over and above differences in terminology and cultural background, we try to show that the quantum physicist, David Bohm, and poststructuralist philosopher, Gilles Deleuze, shared a common aim in thought: to replace the classical image of reality, which is still dominant in our time, with a metaphysics finally in agreement with the concepts and results of relativity, quantum mechanics andcontemporary biology. For these two thinkers, the world of things that are well individuated in space and time, and ordered according to (...) mechanical relations of cause and effect, are nothing but the momentary expression of an “undivided wholeness in flowing movement” that constitutes its true ontological ground. By means of this new metaphysics, the world of daily experience and classical science appears as the explicit manifestation or development of implicate order that undivided wholeness contains virtually in itself at deeper and deeper levels of envelopment and imbrication. The explicit world is the result of a process of repetition, deceleration and temporal stabilization, triggered by the interaction of our measuring instruments – technical devices, sensory organs and motors, a priori forms and categories of the understanding – with moving wholeness, the thinking and observing subject of which represents a momentary and partial reflection rather than a solitaryand autonomous fragment. By criticizing the classical image of thecorrespondence/adequation of being and thought, Bohm and Deleuzeshow that the thought seeking to grasp this wholeness in flowingmovement inevitably interacts with it – by modifying, recreating andaccomplishing it in one direction rather than another. Thought thusresembles a dance that tries to harmonize with the universal flux thatgenerates and carries it away in a single movement with matter. **************************************************************************************************** ***********************Para além das diferenças de terminologia e de background cultural, tenta-se aqui mostrar que o físico quântico David Bohm e o filósofo pós-estruturalista Gilles Deleuze tiverem um objetivo comum de pensamento: substituir a imagem clássica da realidade, ainda dominante em nossa época, por uma metafísica finalmente de acordo com os conceitos e resultados da relatividade, da mecânica quântica e da biologia contemporânea. Para estes dois pensadores, o mundo das coisas bem individuadas no espaço e no tempo, e ordenadas conforme as relações mecânicas de causa e efeito, não é nada outro que a expressão momentânea de uma “Totalidade indivisa em devir” que constitui seu verdadeiro fundamento ontológico. Pelo meio desta nova metafisica, o mundo da experiência cotidiana e da ciência clássica aparece como a manifestação explicita ou desenvolvida da ordem implícita que a totalidade indivisa contém virtualmente nela mesma em níveis de envolvimento e de imbricação sempre mais profundos. O mundo explícito é o resultado de um processo de repetição, desaceleração e estabilização temporal, desencadeado pela interação de nossos instrumentos de medição -- aparelhos técnicos, órgãos sensoriais e motores, formas “a priori” e categorias do entendimento – com uma totalidade movente no qual o sujeito pensante e observante representa um reflexo momentâneo e parcial ao invés de um fragmento solitário e autônomo. Ao criticar a imagem clássica da correspondência/adequação entre o ser e o pensamento, Bohm e Deleuze mostram finalmente que o pensamento que intenta capturar esta Totalidade em devir interage inevitavelmente com ela, modificando-a, recriando-a e realizando-a em uma direção ao invés de outra. O pensamento se aparenta assim a uma dança que tenta se harmonizar com o flux universal que o gera e o leva em um movimento só com a matéria.Palavras-chave: Bohm; Deleuze; totalidade indivisa em devir; física quântica; pós-estruturalismo; ontologia. (shrink)

Aristotelian virtue is the source of the soul’s best actions and passions. It can compel us to do the best acts and doings, always in a better way. Aristotelian virtue helps us to act under the right reasoning, which is elected from an intellectual disposition called prudence, which is in charge of uniting knowledge and action. Aristotle says one can learn to be virtuous through exercising good habits, with formation, experience and time to do such an exercise. Besides, actions according (...) to virtue will be nice by themselves, if a virtuous man judges righteously. This is precisely the root of good living and good acting for Aristotle. The activities performed by a good man are, then and by themselves, good, nice and happy, and are also related to virtue and to the actions of a virtuous man. This paper aims at analyzing virtue as a pathway to happiness, the actions to achieve it and to describe some intellectual and moral virtues established within the moral philosophy of this thinker. (shrink)